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conceptual activity for thinking, they do nevertheless set the ground rules that make
certain forms of scientific inquiry possible in the first place. I conclude that Carnap’s
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1 Introduction
In this paper I examine an under-explored aspect of Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy
of logic, namely the question of the normative status of logic in the light of his
famous principle of tolerance. It is widely held that logic has, in a sense to be
specified, normative authority over our thinking. The idea can certainly be found
in the works of figures that exercised an important influence on Carnap, Kant and
Frege in particular.1 In order to bring out the originality of Carnap’s view on the
question, it will prove useful first to examine Frege’s conception of the normative
status of logic. This will occupy sections 2 and 3, where I bring two core features
of Frege’s conception of the normative role of logic to the fore: first, the normative
force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms
implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. In section 4, I explain how
Carnap’s adoption of the principle of tolerance and, with it, the abandonment of
Fregean realism and monism about logic leads him to a form of voluntarism about
logical norms: it is we who, by adopting a linguistic framework, invest logic with
a normative force that it does not otherwise have. By contrast, I demonstrate in
section 5 that, although Carnap does not take logic to issue in constitutive norms
for thinking in the same way Frege does, he nevertheless endorses a relativized
analogue of Frege’s thesis. According to my interpretation, it is constitutive of the
very possibility of a system of linguistic representation in which properly truth-
evaluable claims can be made that it should be logically structured.
2 Frege’s conception of logical laws—the descrip-
tive and the normative
‘Like ethics’, Frege writes, logic is a normative discipline (Frege 1897, p. 226).
Its aim is to lay down the laws of thought. However, there is an ambiguity in
the phrase ‘law of thought’ that is apt to give rise to pernicious psychologistic
misunderstandings, and so calls for immediate clarification. As we will see, the
meaning of ‘law’ in that phrase of crucial importance. Before turning to the task
1Though see Tolley (2006, 2008) for critical discussion of the supposed normativity of logic
in Kant.
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of clarifying ‘law’, though, we do well to say a few words about how ‘thought’ is
to be understood in this context.
‘Thought’ is systematically ambiguous in English between the mental acts,
events or states that constitute thinking (judging, inferring, believing, suppos-
ing, etc.) and the objects or contents of those acts and states (in the present
case, Fregean Gedanken, i.e. the senses of sentences and primary truth-bearers—
(Fregean) propositions, in modern parlance). Norms apply to practices or activ-
ities. Thus, only thoughts in the former sense can meaningfully be regarded as
proper subjects of normative appraisal. And so when we speak of logic being
normative for thought or thinking, ‘thought’ is to be understood in this former
sense—roughly, as the conceptual activity through which we form and revise be-
liefs (cf. MacFarlane (2002, p. 35, fn. 16)). That being said, Frege sometimes
uses ‘thinking’ not as an umbrella term for mental acts and states such as judg-
ing, supposing, believing, etc., but rather as a particular such act. For instance,
Frege writes that from the laws of logic ‘there follow prescriptions about asserting,
thinking, judging, inferring? (1918, p. 325). ‘Thinking’ in this narrower sense
designates the act of apprehending or grasping a thought (or proposition) (Frege
1918, p. 294) without thereby taking a stance on its truth-value. As MacFarlane
correctly notes,2
it is hard to see how the laws of logic could provide norms for thinking
in this sense. The principle of non-contradiction does not imply that
we ought not grasp contradictory thoughts: indeed, sometimes we must
grasp such thoughts, when they occur inside the scope of a negation
or in the antecedent of a conditional (Frege 1923, 50). Thus, it seems
most reasonable to take Frege’s talk of norms for thinking as talk of
norms for judging. Norms for thinking, in this sense, will include norms
for inferring, which for Frege is simply the making of judgments on the
basis of other judgments (MacFarlane 2002, p. 36, fn. 18).
For example, it is clear that ‘thought’ and ‘thinking’ are to be understood in this
broader sense when Frege observes that ‘thinking as it actually takes place is not
2I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising the same point, and so helping me to
appreciate the need to clarify this issue.
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always in agreement with the laws of logic’ (cited in Taschek (2008, p. 381)) or
when he writes that the laws of logic ‘prescribe universally how one should think if
one is to think at all’ (Frege 1893, p. xv). His phrase ‘if we call [the laws of logic]
laws of thought, or, better, laws of judgment’ (cited in Taschek (2008, p. 381))
makes it clear that this what is meant.
Turn now to the task of clarifying ‘law’ as it appears in ‘laws of thought’. In
a well-known passage in the Preface to the first volume of his Grundgesetze der
Arithmetik, Frege seeks to forestall such misapprehensions by distinguishing two
senses of ‘law’:
In one sense [a law] states what is, in another sense it prescribes what
ought to be. It is only in the sense in which they lay down how one
ought to think that the logical laws may be called laws of thought
(Frege 1893, xv.)
Following Frege, we can thus distinguish the following two types of laws:
• Laws with a descriptive dimension have law-to-world direction of fit.
They describe ‘certain regularities in the order of things—typically those
with high explanatory value or counterfactual robustness’ (MacFarlane 2002,
p. 35), as in the case of the laws of nature. Consequently, laws descriptively
understood cannot be violated, as any genuine exception to a would-be law
would strip it of its status of (descriptive) law.3
• Laws with a prescriptive dimension have world-to-law direction of fit.
They ‘prescribe what one ought to do or provide a standard for the evalua-
tion of one’s conduct as good or bad’ (MacFarlane 2002, p. 35). Therefore,
prescriptive laws can be violated as in the case of legal or moral norms or of
rules of etiquette.
Seeing that the passage just quoted precedes one of Frege’s most virulent anti-
psychologistic diatribes, it is tempting to read Frege’s distinction between descrip-
tive and prescriptive laws as doing double duty as a means of demarcating logic
3As the definition suggests, descriptive laws are generally in the business of describing reality
and so are, prima facie at least, answerable to facts. This is not to say that descriptive laws are
necessarily empirical and metaphysically contingent. Frege took the laws of logic to be descriptive
and yet necessary.
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from psychology. The all-important distinction between the disciplines of psychol-
ogy and logic, the thought goes, parallels the distinction between the two types
of laws of thought. Both disciplines are in the business of laying down laws of
thought, but in crucially different ways. Psychology, being an empirical science,
seeks to produce systematic generalizations describing the cognitive behavior of
average reasoners in a given population—its concern is with the laws of thought
descriptively understood. Logic, by contrast, lays down the canons for correct
reasoning—its concern is with the laws of thought prescriptively understood. The
distinction between psychology and logic, on this picture, boils down to a straight-
forward is-ought distinction: psychology tells us how we do in fact think; logic
tells us how we ought to think.4
But this portrayal grossly over-simplifies Frege’s actual position. For while
logic certainly does have a normative role to play in our rational economy on his
view, logic is not merely, and indeed not primarily, normative. Rather the laws of
logic are ‘generalizations that set forth what is’ and as such are firmly anchored
in and beholden to an objective reality (Ricketts 1996, p. 127). Like the laws of
psychology, biology and physics, the laws of logic are first and foremost descriptive
in that they are responsible to how things stand in the world.5 The following
passage makes this plain:
[t]he word ‘law’ is used in two senses. When we speak of laws of
morals or the state we mean regulations which ought to be obeyed but
4Passages like the following reinforce this (as we will see) erroneous interpretation
If we call [the laws of logic] laws of thought, or, better, laws of judgment, we must
not forget we are concerned here with laws which, like principles of morals or laws
of the state, prescribe how we are to act, and do not, like laws of nature, define
the actual course of events. Thinking, as it actually takes place, is not always in
agreement with the laws of logic any more than people’s actual behavior is always
in agreement with the moral law (cited in (Taschek 2008, p. 381)).
5As Peter Sullivan points out, this explains why Frege deems it appropriate to present logic
axiomatically:
in adopting [the axiomatic] model Frege was according to logic the status of a
science, [. . . ] this marks a distance between his conception and those both from his
most important predecessor, Kant, and his most important successor, Wittgenstein’
(Sullivan 2004, p. 682).
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with which actual happenings are not always in conformity. Laws of
nature are the generalization of natural occurrences with which the
occurrences are always in accordance. It is rather in this sense that I
speak of laws of truth (Frege 1918, p. 289; my emphasis).6
But what are the laws of logic descriptive of? For Frege the
logical laws are maximally general truths, substantive generalizations
that are ‘about reality’ in the same fashion that the laws of geometry,
physics and chemistry are’ (Ricketts 1996, p. 123).7
But if the logical laws are, in this sense, on a par with the laws of the special
sciences, how can they still be said to be normative? This might strike us as espe-
cially puzzling because the logical laws are not explicitly prescriptive ‘as regards
their content’ (ibid.): they do not contain deontic vocabulary, and they are not
formulated in the imperatival mood. Frege’s Basic Law IIa ∀F∀x(∀yF (y) ⊃ F (x))
6The ‘laws of truth’ is just another name for the laws of logic for Frege. See Taschek (2008)
for an illuminating discussion of the role of truth in Frege’s conception of logic.
7Frege himself is very clear about this point. See e.g. (Frege 1893, xv). See also Warren
(Goldfarb 2010, p. 69), who writes that ‘for Frege [. . . ] it is [. . . ] reality that obeys the laws of
logic’. Still, the claim that Frege’s laws of logic are descriptive of reality in something like the
way the (correct) laws of the natural sciences might be said to be calls for further commentary.
Frege’s laws of logic in fact are about both material or physical reality, as well about abstract, non-
temporal, non-spatial, causally inert things, which have their home in what Frege calls the ‘third
realm’ (the remaining realm being that of mental entities). In our example, Basic Law IIa clearly
quantifies over all objects and all concepts. Many objects (excepting numbers and other abstract
objects) occupy the realm of reference. On the other hand, concepts, for Frege, are functions
and so are denizens of the third realm, alongside thoughts and other abstract objects. There
are, of course, important differences between these two realms (some of which have already been
brought out by our characterization of the two realms). However, I contend that the differences
are immaterial to the claim that I am making: namely, that the laws of logic are descriptive of
these objective realms. And both realms—the realm of material things and that of immaterial
abstract things—are objective for Frege in the sense that neither is ‘intrinsically borne by a mind,
as a pain or an after image is’ (Burge 1992, p. 637). As for the metaphysical status that Frege
ascribes to the third realm, interpreters have differed. For instance, ‘literal’ interpretations take
Frege’s realist talk about the ‘third realm’ at face value (e.g. (Burge 1992). Opposed to such
realist interpretations, are views which favor a broadly idealist/practice-dependent construal of
the third realm (e.g. (Weiner 1995)). To the extent to which logical laws are also about the
third realm, the latter type of interpretation may be thought to put some pressure on my talk of
Fregean realism about logic. However, even on Weiner’s view the third realm is objective at least
in the sense that its existence is independent of our actual practices. My main point, that for
Frege the normativity of logic is grounded in its descriptive adequacy with respect to an (even
minimally) objective realm of things, remains unscathed.
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(Frege 1893, §20), for instance, does not wear its normative import on its sleeve.
It is simply a universal claim about all concepts and all objects: if a concept holds
of all objects, it will also hold of the object in question. As MacFarlane puts it,
in the statement of the law ‘there are no oughts or mays or musts : no norms in
sight!’ (MacFarlane 2002, p. 35).8
Wherein, then, does the normativity of logic reside? The answer is that while
the laws of logic are not explicitly prescriptive, they nevertheless issue prescrip-
tions. In Frege’s words,
from the laws of [logic] there follow prescriptions about asserting, think-
ing, judging, inferring’ (Frege 1918, p. 325).
More precisely, a law of logic implies the prescription to conform one’s thinking
to the law in appropriate ways.9 Consequently, the laws of logic issue in both
descriptions and prescriptions. The descriptive laws they give rise to concern the
most general ‘regularities in the order of things’; the prescriptive laws set standards
of correctness to which our thinking is answerable, and which we can fail to live
up to.10 The prescriptive aspect of logical laws is therefore directly consequent
upon their descriptive adequacy: it is because the laws of logic accurately depict
how things stand objectively, that we ought appropriately to align our thinking
with them. As such, the normativity of logic distinguishes itself markedly from
conventional prescriptive laws: the laws of logic are not socially instituted or in any
other way the product of human doings, whether deliberate or somehow guided by
an invisible hand process. The logical norms simply emanate from the immutable
logical laws, the
boundary stones fixed in an eternal foundation that our thinking can
overflow but never displace (Frege 1893, p. xvi),
as Frege memorably put it.
8The example of Basic Law IIa is also borrowed from (MacFarlane 2002).
9‘Appropriate ways’ is a necessary qualification, because the connection between logical rules
and norms of belief regulation is not always straightforward. The reasons for this are familiar
from Gilbert Harman’s work (Harman 1986). I am assuming here without argument that some
such connection nevertheless exists, see (Field 2009a) and (MacFarlane 2004) for discussions.
10It is in this latter sense that passages like the one quoted in footnote 4 above are to be
understood.
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But Frege does not take this dual status—being simultaneously descriptive and
prescriptive—to be peculiar to logical laws. The feature is common to all scientific
laws.
Each law that states what is can be conceived as prescribing that one
ought to think in accord with it, and so, in this sense, is a law of
thought. This holds no less for geometrical and physical laws than for
logical ones (Frege 1893, p. xv).11
The ensuing picture might be summarized as follows. The correct laws of
physics adequately describe portions of reality.12 As such they set standards of
correctness for our thinking with respect to the physical arena; if we want to judge,
believe and infer truly about the physical world, we had better align our thinking
with the laws of physics. Similarly, it is because logic correctly describes certain
features—the most general features—of reality that we ought not to think in ways
contrary to its laws. In this sense, the laws of physics and the laws of logic have
both descriptive and prescriptive dimensions. Nevertheless, as norms, these laws
differ from merely conventional prescriptive laws because only the former are, as
it were, anchored in an objective reality.
11In a very similar vein, Frege writes
we could with equal justice think of laws of geometry and of physics as laws of thought
or laws of judgment, namely as prescriptions to which our judgments must conform
in a different domain if they are to remain in agreement with the truth (cited in
(Taschek 2008, p. 466).
12‘Laws of physics’ could be taken in either of two senses here. It could refer to the true
(actually obtaining) laws of physics in which case the standard of correctness would be alethic.
They could also refer to the laws postulated by our best current scientific theory, in which case
the standard of correctness adverted to would be epistemic in nature (cf. MacFarlane 2002, p.
37, fn. 19). It is pretty clear, it seems to me, that Frege conceived of the laws of physics in the
former sense (e.g. Frege 1897, p. 133), but this matters little for our purposes. Whatever Frege’s
stance on the laws of physics, there can be no doubt, as we have seen in the passage likening
the laws of logic to an ‘eternal foundation’, that the logical laws have the status of objective and
immutable laws of truth which are what they are quite independently of our capacity correctly
to identify them.
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3 Frege’s constitutivity thesis
Given what we have said so far, one would be warranted in concluding that the
normativity of logic is of a kind with that which attaches to the laws of the
particular sciences. If there is anything that sets the normativity of logic apart,
the difference would seem to consist in the scope of its normative import: while
the laws of physics, bio-chemistry or geology are confined to a particular domain
of inquiry, logic is characterized by its ‘maximal generality’—its task is that of
saying what holds with the utmost generality for all thinking, whatever
its subject matter (Frege 1897, p. 228).
However, some authors have made the case that Frege conceived of the normativ-
ity that attaches to the laws of logic as being characterized by a distinctive kind of
oomph, over and above their universality. It is by virtue of this special distinguish-
ing feature, they maintain, that the laws of logic enjoy a ‘proprietary claim to the
title “laws of thought”, conceived normatively’ (Taschek 2008, p. 383). The crucial
extra feature in question is that the laws of logic are constitutively normative for
thought as such, i.e. thinking about any subject matter at all.13
Saying that logic is constitutively normative for thought amounts to the claim
that for an activity to count as thinking it must be ‘assessable in the light of the
laws of logic’ (MacFarlane 2002, p. 37). In other words, for mental acts or states
of a particular agent to count as acts or states of thinking—to count as judgments,
inferences or beliefs, say—the agent must be appropriately sensitive to the laws
of logic.14 Were a creature to fail, persistently and systematically, to display the
13I do think this interpretation of Frege has a lot going for it. And I will assume it in the
following. However, even if it turns out that it does not ultimately stand as a matter of Frege
scholarship, it nevertheless provides a useful foil for the discussion of Carnap’s conception of the
normativity of logic.
14This interpretation of Frege’s conception of the normativity of logic has been pushed most
forcefully by MacFarlane (2000, 2002) and Taschek (2008). But the central idea seems to me to
be endorsed more or less explicitly by a number of authors. To give just one example, Michael
Friedman writes,
The principles and theorems of the Begriffsschrift are implicit in the requirements
of any coherent thinking about anything at all, and this is how Frege’s construction
of arithmetic within the Begriffsschrift is to provide an answer to Kant: arithmetic
is in no sense dependent on our spatiotemporal intuition but is built in to the most
general conditions of thought (Friedman1999c, p. 167).
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requisite sensitivity to the logical strictures, we would not be able to recognize it
as a thinking being at all.
The relevant contrast here is that logic is not merely normative in a regulative
sense, but in a constitutive sense.15 Let me elaborate. The distinction between reg-
ulative and constitutive norms or principles is Kantian at root (KRV A179/B222).
Here, however, I refer primarily to John Searle’s way of drawing it. According to
Searle, regulative norms ‘regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of
behavior’, such as rules of etiquette or traffic laws. Constitutive norms, by contrast
create or define new forms of behavior. The rules of football or chess,
for example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess but as
it were they create the very possibility of playing such games’ (Searle
1969, p. 33–34), see also (Searle 2010, p. 97).
Take the case of traffic rules. While I ought to abide by the traffic rules, I can
choose to ignore them. Rowdy driving in violation of the traffic code might well
result in my losing my license. Yet no matter how cavalier my attitude towards
traffic laws is, my activity still counts as driving. Contrast this with the rules
governing the game of chess. I cannot in the same way opt out of conforming
to the rules of chess while continuing to count as playing chess ; in systematically
violating the rules of chess and persisting in doing so even in the face of criticism,
I forfeit my right to the title ‘chess player’. Unless one appropriately acknowledges
that one’s moves are subject to the rules of chess, one’s activity does not qualify
This interpretation also bears some resemblance to the tradition of Frege interpretation origi-
nating with Burton Dreben and Jean van Heijenoort (and which has gained significant influence
in the writings of Ricketts and Goldfarb among others). Central to this tradition is the notion
of ‘logocentrism’, the idea that for Frege there is no extra-logical vantage point to be had, and
in particular that there is no possibility of a meta-linguistic stance in the contemporary. In
the absence of such an external standpoint, we cannot speak, on Frege’s picture, of the relation
between language and that to which it refers. This, in turn, is supposed to lead us to reassess
Frege’s apparent realist commitments. See Sullivan (2004) for an illuminating critical discussion
of this tradition. Though the logocentrist tradition is of course related to the present project,
its aims are importantly different. Our (rather more narrow) focus is squarely on the project
of developing and comparing the constitutivist accounts of the normativity of logic that can be
found in Frege and Carnap. No such position is suggested, let alone implied by the logocentrist
tradition. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing on this point.
15Much of this discussion is inspired by Clinton Tolley’s (2006) insightful discussion of the
normativity of logic in Kant. Our main difference is that Tolley thinks that constitutive principles
cannot carry normative force; I believe they can. A full discussion would lead us too far afield.
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as playing chess. According to the reading of Frege we are considering, the laws of
logic are to thought what the rules of chess are to the game of chess: I cannot fail
to acknowledge that the laws of logic set standards of correctness for my thinking
without thereby jeopardizing my status as a thinker. In this sense, the laws of
logic create the very possibility of conceptual activity. As Frege puts it: ‘the laws
of logic prescribe universally how one should think if one is to think at all ’ (Frege
1897, p. xv; my emphasis).
This reading of Frege according to which the logical laws enjoy a distinctive
kind of normativity—a constitutive normativity—is supported also by a number
of further passages, as for example in his argument for the fundamental difference
in nature between arithmetic and geometry in Grundlagen der Arithmetik, namely
that the former is while the latter is not analytic.
For purposes of conceptual thought we can always assume the contrary
of some one or other of the geometrical axioms, without involving our-
selves in any self-contradictions when we proceed to our deductions,
despite the conflict between our assumptions and our intuition. The
fact that this is possible shows that the axioms of geometry are indepen-
dent of one another and of the primitive laws of logic, and consequently
are synthetic. Can the same be said of the fundamental propositions
of the science of number? Here, we have only to try denying any one
of them, and complete confusion ensues. Even to think at all seems no
longer possible. The basis of arithmetic lies deeper, it seems than that
of any of the empirical sciences, and even than that of geometry. The
truths of arithmetic govern all that is numerable. This is the widest
domain of all; for to it belongs not only the actual, not only the intu-
itable, but everything thinkable. Should not the laws of number, then,
be connected very intimately with the laws of thought? (Frege 1884,
§14)
Frege’s argument in this passage plainly relies on the assumption that logic is
constitutive for thinking. It is because he presupposes that upon renouncing a
logical law ‘complete confusion’ would immediately ‘ensue’ that Frege can argue
for the analyticity of arithmetic on the basis that the denial of any of its axioms
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would equally render thought impossible altogether.16
The preface to the first volume of his Grundgesetze points in the same direc-
tion. In a famous passage, Frege imagines being confronted with creatures whose
judgments and assertions would be in no way regulated by the logical laws. Illog-
ical creatures of this kind would be utterly unintelligible for us. In Frege’s words,
we would have encountered a hitherto unknown kind of madness (Frege 1893, p.
xvi). The novelty of this type of madness, presumably, resides in the fact that
it does not consist in a departure from or subversion of our ordinary modes of
thinking, but rather that the creatures in question could not properly be said to
be engaged in anything resembling conceptual activity at all. For partaking in
conceptual activity presupposes manifesting at least a minimal sensitivity to log-
ical strictures. It is in this sense, then, that the previous passage of Frege’s that
‘the laws of logic prescribe universally how one should think if one is to think at
all ’ (idem, p. xv) is to be understood.
We might summarize the interpretation we have been considering as commit-
ting Frege to the
• Constitutivity Thesis (CT): Logic provides constitutive norms for think-
ing as such.
It bears emphasis that attributing CT to Frege is not to saddle him with the
view that in order to think at all one’s thinking must at all times conform to the
logical laws. Such a view would make logical error in our thinking impossible; in
committing a logical blunder, my mental activity would ipso facto cease to qualify
as thinking. Frege explicitly rejects this view on a number of occasions, e.g.:
Thinking, as it actually takes place, is not always in agreement with
the laws of logic any more than people’s actual behavior is always in
agreement with the moral law (Frege 1897, p. 228).
According to our interpretation of CT above, all that is required to qualify as a
thinker, i.e. a being that judges, infers, has beliefs, etc., is that one takes one’s
16It should be noted that Frege’s observation is not entirely correct. For instance, the denial
of the axiom of induction is known to be consistent with the remainder of the Peano-Dedekind
axioms.
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mental acts and states to be evaluable in the light of the laws of logic. That is,
although one may at times (perhaps even frequently and systematically) stray from
the path prescribed by logic in one’s thinking, one nevertheless counts as a thinker
so long as one appropriately acknowledges logic’s normative authority over one’s
thinking. Consider again the game of chess. It seems plausible that I might violate
the rules of chess, deliberately or out of ignorance, and still count as playing chess,
so long, at least, as I acknowledge that my activity is answerable to the rules, for
example, by being disposed to correct myself when the illegal move is pointed out
to me.17 Similarly, all that is necessary to count as a thinker is to be sensitive
to the fact that my practice of judging, inferring, believing, etc., is normatively
constrained by the laws of logic. It is not easy to specify, in any detail, what
the requisite acknowledgment or sensitivity consists in. William Taschek proposes
that acknowledging
the categorical authority of logic will involve one’s possessing a capac-
ity to recognize—when being sincere and reflective, and possibly with
appropriate prompting—logical mistakes both in one’s own judgmental
and inferential practice and that of others (Taschek 2008, p. 384)
Importantly, it is not necessary for the agent in order to have the requisite sen-
sibility to be able explicitly to represent the laws of logic to herself.18 Clearly, a
full account would require filling in a number of blanks here, but for our purposes
Taschek’s sketch will serve just fine.
As we have seen, to say that logic issues in constitutive norms for thinking
is to say that a being that fails appropriately to acknowledge the strictures of
logic cannot be correctly ascribed the types of states and episodes that constitute
thinking. Frege is thus making a substantive claim about the nature of certain
mental states and events: the claim, namely, that it is essential to the conceptual
activity of thinking that it should be constrained by norms of logical cogency in a
particular kind of way.
17Similar points are made by MacFarlane (2002, p. 37) and Taschek (2008, p. 384) in the case
of thinking, and by Timothy Williamson (1996, p. 491) in the case of speaking a language and
performing assertions.
18Again the comparison with Williamson (1996) on the constitutive norms of assertion is
telling.
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We might try to understand this thesis as follows. There are presumably several
distinct levels at which we can describe our mental life. Frege, on this interpreta-
tion, is making the claim that the boundary between the kinds of mental activity
that constitute thinking, on the one hand, and other kinds of mental activity
(non-conceptual activity like being in pain, for instance), on the other hand, is a
boundary between those mental activities that are characterizable in terms of their
constitutive norms and those that are not. This is not to deny that much can be
learned about thinking and other processes through descriptions that operate at
different, non-normative levels—the ‘symbolic’ or the neurological level of descrip-
tion, say. The claim is merely that if we are interested in demarcating conceptual
activity from other types of mental phenomena, we should look to the constitu-
tive norms governing it. In this sense, Frege might be viewed as a precursor of
contemporary forms of ‘normativism about the mental’: views according to which
any account of intentional states must make ineliminable appeal to the norms that
govern them.19 For instance, consider the view that a form of the truth norm is
constitutive of belief. What makes a belief a belief is that it aims at the truth.
And one way of spelling out the content of that metaphor is via the truth norm:
For all subjects S, for all propositions A: if S considers or ought to consider A,
S ought to believe A if and only if A is true.
Not unlike Frege (on the interpretation of Frege defended here), advocates of the
truth norm are typically normativists about beliefs: they maintain that an appro-
priate account of what makes a belief a belief as opposed to some other mental
state, and hence what makes it meaningful to speak of beliefs in the first place, is
an account of the norms that are essential to believing. Frege’s CT is comparable
but targets a rather more general activity, that of thinking.20
So much for Frege’s account of the normativity of logic. Before turning to
Carnap, however, let us briefly take stock of our findings up to this point. These
are the two pivotal features of Frege’s conception of the normativity of logic.
1. Logic issues in laws that are both descriptive and prescriptive. The relation
between the two aspects is such that the normative force of the laws of
19See e.g. Wedgwood (2006) and Zangwill 2005).
20The notion that CT (or variants of it) might be directed towards different target activities,
will play a central role in section 5.
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logic is grounded in their descriptive adequacy. Hence, we ought to align
our thinking with the logical laws precisely because they afford an accurate
representation of the most general features of reality. Frege’s account of
the normativity of logic is thus intimately connected with his monism and
realism about logic: there is one true logic and that logic issues in substantive
generalizations that are answerable to an objective reality. It is in virtue of
its descriptive adequacy that logic exerts normative force on our thinking.
2. The laws of logic have a special normative status because they give rise
to norms that are constitutive (as opposed to merely regulative) for our
practices of judgment, inference and belief: an activity can count as thinking
only if it is assessable in the light of the logical laws.
4 Carnap’s voluntarism
So much for Frege’s view of the matter. How, in light of our previous discussion,
should we characterize Carnap’s view of the normativity of logic? The obvious
starting point is Carnap’s dramatic departure from Frege’s conception of the na-
ture of logic. In what has been hailed as Carnap’s ‘most original and fundamental
philosophical move’ (Friedman 1999a, p. 169), Carnap abandons the ‘absolutist’
conception of logic—the notion that there is but one true Logic. In one fell swoop,
Carnap jettisons both Frege’s realism and his monism.21 Logic is not in the busi-
ness of describing reality. Therefore, its laws lack any descriptive dimension; they
are not answerable to an external standard against which they could be judged
to be true or false, correct or incorrect. Nor, therefore, can the legitimacy of the
resultant norms be grounded in the correctness of the system from which they
flow. Indeed, for Carnap the question of ‘correctness’ cannot even be meaning-
fully asked when it comes to logical systems. All logical systems are prima facie
equal. Carnap’s well-known laissez-faire attitude with regard to this question is
21Admittedly, the formulation here is somewhat misleading as to Carnap’s actual intellectual
development. It is really Wittgenstein’s universalism (not Frege) that occupies Carnap most in
the period when he first conceives of the principle of tolerance. See Friedman (1999b) and Awodey
and Carus (2009) for helpful accounts of Carnap’s thinking around this time. My presentation
may be excused in the context of this comparative project.
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enshrined in his celebrated principle of tolerance, according to which
everyone is at liberty to build his own logic, i.e. his own form of lan-
guage, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to
discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules
instead of philosophical arguments (Carnap 1937, §17)
We are thus ‘entirely free’ (‘vo¨llig frei ’) (idem, p. xiv) to devise any logical frame-
work we please so long as, in doing so, we comply with Carnap’s exacting stan-
dards of precision. In the absence of standards of external correctness, it is we
who choose logical systems, and we do so on pragmatic grounds: we adopt those
logical systems that best serve our theoretical ends.22
The upshot of this radical break with Frege’s realism and resulting monism for
Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic is immediate. Whatever normative
status logic may enjoy on Carnap’s view, it cannot be grounded in descriptive ad-
equacy, as it is for Frege. On Frege’s view, the laws of logic issue in prescriptions
about how we should think as a result of their status as universal truths—the
normativity of the logical laws, we noted, is directly consequent upon their de-
scriptive adequacy. The ensuing norms are norms that we, qua thinking agents,
are inevitably answerable to. They do not require our approval or acceptance in
order to be norms for us. In contemporary jargon we might say that on Frege’s
view the normative facts supervene on the logical laws.23, normative or not (Frege
1918). Being normative facts these facts rely on the existence of beings whose
activities and practices are sensitive to them in order to exert normative force.
Nevertheless, these facts are objective and mind-independent.
Not so on Carnap’s wholly different conception of the nature of the norms.
According to Carnap, we are the ones who elect a system of logic. It is by endorsing
22Carnap’s conception of logic, we must not forget, is rather more encompassing than what
most contemporary authors would be comfortable with. This is not to say, of course, that there
is currently anything like a consensus about what falls under the remit of logic. All the same,
most would nowadays shirk from lumping together inference rules for the standard connectives
and the axioms of induction and of choice under the heading of ‘L(ogical)-rules’, as Carnap does
(Carnap 1937, §30).
23My talk of normative facts should be taken with a grain of salt and is obviously not offered as
an interpretation of Frege in any strict sense. As is well known, Frege rejected any metaphysics
of facts in the sense of correspondence theory of truth
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a system that we invest it with a normative force that it would not otherwise
have. We choose to hold ourselves and our peers accountable to the rules set
out by the selected logical system, and we do so because we judge that doing so
serves our theoretical ends. Carnap’s principle of tolerance thus is accompanied
by a voluntarism about logical norms: logical norms are self-imposed. Perhaps
we could say that Carnap sets out a positivistic conception of logical norms in
opposition to Frege’s ‘logical jus naturalism’.
5 Carnap’s relativized constitutivity thesis
Let us turn now to the second feature of Frege’s conception of the normative status
of logic, CT; i.e. the idea that logic sets constitutive norms for all thinking. Is the
Carnapian conception that has begun to emerge in the last section compatible with
CT? The short answer is that it cannot be. At least not in quite the same way. For
even our sketchy characterization of CT makes it clear that an activity governed by
constitutive norms—in this case the ‘activity’ of thinking—cannot simultaneously
be governed by two or more sets of extensionally distinct constitutive norms.
To see this, suppose we had two extensionally distinct sets of norms N1 and
N2 both of which are assumed to be constitutive of some activity A.
24 Suppose
that according to N1 but not N2 one must φ in order to count as Aing. Well,
if N1 really is constitutive of A, then I cannot A unless I appropriately take my
actions to be answerable to N1. In particular, my failure to φ jeopardizes my
status as an Aer, unless I am disposed readily to correct myself and to proceed
to φ once I become aware of my violation (or at least appropriately acknowledge
my transgression as such). That, as we have seen, is just what it means to A: to
acknowledge that my actions are to be evaluated by the standards set by N1, in
particular the injunction to φ. But in the scenario we are imagining A is equally
24Notice that two extensionally equivalent norms may be intensionally distinct (e.g. ‘you ought
to take the sum of x and 1 and then multiply the result by 2’ and ‘you ought to multiply x by 2 and
multiply 1 by 2 and then add the products’ are intensionally distinct norms that are extensionally
equivalent because 2(x + 1) = 2x + 2. Another example is ‘You ought to believe what David
Lewis writes’ and ‘You ought to believe what Bruce LeCatt writes’). I assume here that norms
are individuated extensionally. In the case of logical norms this is unproblematic. Two logical
norms are distinct if and only if the logical laws that give rise to them are (extensionally) distinct.
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governed by N2, a set of norms that does not include the injunction that one must
φ, but which, ex hypothesi, is equally constitutive of A. Hence, so long as my
actions are suitably responsible to N2, I am exempt from φing while nevertheless
counting as Aing. But this means that N1 is not constitutively normative of Aing
after all, contradicting our initial assumption.
If this is right, it should be true in particular in the case of logic and thought:
thought cannot be normatively constituted by two distinct sets of logical norms.
Given that no two extensionally distinct logical laws can give rise to the same set
of norms, it follows that thought is governed by a unique set of logical laws by the
standards of CT. In short, CT entrains a commitment to logical monism in the
sense that there can be but one constitutive norm-setting logic. But this means
that CT is incompatible with Carnap’s logical pluralism.
But it seems too quick to dismiss the notion of a tolerance-tolerating variant of
CT. The following analogy stirs us in the right direction. Arguably, the rule of law
is a constitutive condition for a state’s (in the political sense) being just. But the
rule of law can be realized in multiple ways. It can be realized in different types of
legal and constitutional frameworks and can be upheld by various kinds of political
and judicial institutions. All that matters is that the state and its legislative and
judiciary branches conform to certain standards (e.g. that the law be clearly stated,
public, prospective, applicable to all and, on a ‘thick’ reading of ‘rule of law’, that
it protect a certain number of rights, etc.). The idea, then, is that there are a
number of different legal frameworks all meeting the appropriate standards, but
there is no single framework the adoption of which would be necessary to guarantee
the rule of law. For a state to be just it is necessary that it adopt some suitable
legal framework satisfying the aforementioned standards, but it does not matter
much which. (In practice, of course, it might matter a great deal because certain
systems and types of institutions are preferable to others in a given situation, but
we may ignore these complications here.)
Put schematically: what we are imagining is an activity or practice governed
by what we might dub a disjunctive constitutive norm. Consider again the case of
Aing. For Aing to be governed by a disjunctive constitutive norm means (in the
simplest case involving only two sets of constitutive norms) that in order to count
as Aing one’s actions must be governed by either of the extensionally distinct sets
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of norms N1 or N2 (though not both). Hence, Ann and Bob might both A even
though Ann might be normatively constrained by N1 and Bob by N2. It would be
wrong to say of either N1 or N2 that only they are constitutive of Aing. What is
constitutive of Aing is that one acknowledges the force of one of N1 or N2 on one’s
actions in the right kind of way.
Most games are not like this. One is not given distinct sets of rules and told
that in order to play the game one must abide by one (and only one) of those
sets. In some games, however, there may be variations on rules that have this
sort of disjunctive effect. For example, there are different schools when it comes
to casual pool playing (though not of course at the level of official competition).
According to some, the eight ball can be potted in any hole provided the player
announces the hole prior to the shot; according to others, it must be potted in
the hole directly opposite the ball last potted, etc. Another example is whether to
allow castling or not in chess.25 Our attitude towards this, presumably, is that one
counts as playing pool no matter which of the rules one adopts. All that matters
is that the players in a particular game agree on the rules in force.
But could thought be like this? Might it be constitutive of thought not that
there is a unique set of logical norms to which thinking is subject, but rather
that the thinker acknowledge the normative authority of one set of logical laws
among a range of different but equally acceptable options? According to this
picture there are more than one, potentially numerous, sets of norms. None of
them has an exclusive claim to being constitutive for thought, but in order to
count as thinking one must acknowledge the authority of exactly one (any one) of
them. This leads us to a weaker version of CT. Call it relativized CT (and the
Fregean position entertained thus far: strict CT ). Logic could then be said to be
constitutively normative in this relativized sense if it is essential to thought that
it be responsible to some logical norms. What distinguishes relativized CT from
strict CT is that there is no single logical consequence relation with a claim to
laying down the norms of all thinking. There are several consequence relations,
each of which gives rise to the logical norms potentially constitutive of thought.
For that potentiality to be realized the corresponding logical framework would have
to be selected. We might imagine, for instance, that all Dutch people operated
25I am grateful to an anonymous referee for the example.
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on the basis of intuitionist logic, while the rest of the world favors classical logic.
Both the Dutch and everyone else would count as thinking, they would just think
differently, logically speaking. On this view, thought, much like the rule of law, is
characterized by its multiple normative realizability.
How does Carnap fit into this picture? Well, he certainly does not appear to
make an analogous claim about the nature of the states and events that comprise
thinking. And yet there is a sense in which Carnap can, and indeed does, coher-
ently hold both tolerance and a weakened, relativized version of CT. What sense
is that? Well, one’s chosen logico-linguistic framework does set norms, constitu-
tive norms even, but these norms are not constitutive of thought understood as
the psychological activity of individual agents. Rather, linguistic frameworks in
Carnap’s sense set standards of correctness that make truth-evaluable claims first
possible.26
The idea is this. A language or linguistic frame is a vocabulary along with a set
of formation rules and a set of transformation rules. It is the job of formation rules
to determine which grammatical constructions are permissible. It is the job of the
transformation rules to specify which types of inferential moves are permissible.
Transformation rules fall into logico-mathematical L-rules and (possibly) extra-
logical P(hysical)-rules, which embody principles involving descriptive (as well as
logical vocabulary).27 The L-rules generate a relation of logical consequence, they
set out the ground rules that
define standards for the acceptance and the rejection of sentences and
theories formulated within the calculus and [so define the] standards
for a language-relative notion of cognitive correctness (Ricketts 2007,
p. 206).
How does this work? Linguistic frameworks are evaluated on the basis of their
26As can be gleaned from some of the quoted passages, a number of authors have noted the
constitutive role played by linguistic frameworks in Carnap’s thought (Creath (2007), Friedman
(1999a), Richardson (2007), Ricketts (2007)). My aim here is to develop these observations into
a full-fledged account of Carnap’s conception of the normative role of logic, and to demonstrate
the significance of the latter for his greater philosophical projects.
27I am deliberately skirting a number of intricacies that are inessential to my point here. See
Friedman (1999a), Koellner (2013) and Ricketts (2007) for helpful discussions of some of the
issues involved.
20
potential to serve as suitable (local or global) languages of science. In order for a
linguistic framework to perform this function, it must be ‘coordinated’ with our
sensible experience by identifying (or adding, if need be) a descriptive vocabulary
that includes observation predicates (O-predicates). The descriptive vocabulary
receives its meaning from the P-rules that govern it and from its logical connections
with the O-predicates. Rather than assuming, as Frege did, a pre-existent realm of
senses and thoughts that one’s vocabulary would then have to be mapped onto by
means of necessarily imprecise verbal ‘elucidations’, Carnap starts with a purely
syntactic specification of the language, which receives meaning through the said
process of coordination with our theoretical principles and our observations.28 It
is thus by forging connections between P-rules, the mathematical machinery and
our empirical data that logic contributes to endowing the descriptive vocabulary
with meaning. As Alan Richardson aptly puts it:
logic provides the formal conditions for sense-making. Suppose we
wish to know the reason the sky is blue. The object for which we
want the reason is the sentence ‘the sky is blue’; a theoretical reason
is then another sentence within the same language from which our
target reason logically follows. The very notion of a theoretical reason,
therefore, makes sense only internal to a logical framework. Thus there
is no realm of theoretical reasons that can be appealed to in advance
of the adoption of a logical system. [. . . ] The adoption of some logical
system is necessary for there to be a notion of evidence or theoretical
reason in the first place (Richardson 2007, p. 300–301).
Thus, a logical framework is necessary for there to be theoretical reasons and hence
the possibility of making and evaluating meaningful claims at all. It is in this sense
that logic ‘provides the formal conditions of sense-making’. It is only once we have
specified what follows from what, which statements are logically incompatible with
which other ones, and so on, that we determine the truth-conditions and hence
28I am describing Carnap’s view during his syntactic period, relying mainly on (Carnap 1936)
and (Carnap 1937). After Carnap’s shift to semantics it becomes possible to specify the relations
between the appropriate syntactic items and their designata in the metalanguage explicitly. I
take it that the transition to his semantic period does not change anything about the constitutive
role of logic in determining meaning. See Carnap (1939).
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the meanings of the sentences in our language.
It should be clear by now that the norms set forth by one’s adopted logic (or
the L-rules of one’s preferred linguistic framework, if you prefer) have a genuinely
constitutive function in the relativized sense defined above. They create the very
possibility of truth-evaluable and so of cognitive discourse. For only a system of
linguistic representation with some such logical structure can be said to give rise
to meaningful theoretical questions. But this invites the question how much and
what kind of logical structure a linguistic framework must have in order for it to be
able to play this all-important constitutive role. Given Carnap’s firm commitment
to tolerance, this necessary requirement cannot be substantive in the sense of
providing an identifiable range of logical principles that would constitute a core
logic and of which any system of L-rules would then have to be a super-structure.
On the other hand, the notion that the logical structure in question would be
so minimal that virtually anything—my office chair, say—might be viewed as
(the sole) sign-token instantiating a system with the requisite structure is equally
implausible. The upshot, it would seem, is that a linguistic framework would have
to possess certain minimal structural prerequisites in order for it to qualify as
a suitable candidate. The task of identifying these structural prerequisites is a
difficult and important one, but it is not one I can undertake within the scope of
this paper.
However, even these very general considerations raise a further interesting ques-
tion: if all systems of linguistic representation apt at fulfilling the said constitutive
function must share certain structural features, does this not show that Carnap
is committed to a form of absolutism after all? Or at least, does it not show the
principle of tolerance to be considerably more tame than we might have believed it
to be? And if so, might Carnap’s take on logic’s normative status not reveal him
to be closer to Frege’s metaphysical conception of logic—Frege’s absolutism—after
all? It would then appear that Carnap too is committed to the existence of certain
necessary, unrevisable conditions common to all suitable linguistic frameworks.
What is undoubtedly true is that tolerance (and with it our freedom to con-
struct logical systems and to impose the corresponding norms upon ourselves) has
its limits. In a sense this should not come as too great a surprise. All the same,
our discussion has revealed a convergence in Frege’s and Carnap’s thinking—their
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shared commitment to the idea that conceptual activity presupposes the existence
of logical structure—which is perhaps unexpected. But it would be wrong, I think,
to conclude from this that the opposition between Frege and Carnap is in fact just
an opposition between two distinct absolutist positions. The reason this would be
a mistake is because it overlooks an important difference between a commitment
to the necessity of certain structural features on the one hand, and a commitment
to a specific set of logical principles on the other. The former commitment remains
compatible with Carnap’s conventionalism, as well as with the relativized version
of CT; the latter does not. Frege’s commitment is clearly of the latter kind. He
claims not only that a system of logical norms—any system of logical norms—is
acceptable so long as it meets certain minimal requirements. Rather we ought to
comply with a logical principle like
∀p∀q(p→ (q → p))
because it correctly describes reality. Carnapian tolerance, in contrast, is compat-
ible with systems of logic that countenance the principle in question, as well as
with ones—e.g. relevance logics—that do not. Consequently, the fundamental dif-
ference between Frege’s strict version of the constitutivity thesis whereupon logical
normativity remains firmly grounded in its descriptive adequacy on the one hand,
and Carnap?s relativized version of the constitutivity thesis with its voluntarism
about logical norms on the other hand, remains intact. While we cannot choose
not to adopt a system of logical norms and still engage in conceptual activity, the
particular norms we do adopt still are ones we impose upon ourselves.29
Finally, a word on the question of the target activities of logical constitutive
norms. As we have noted, the constitutive norms set by logic appear to be di-
rected towards a different activity for Carnap than for Frege. Whilst on Frege’s
conception the norms induced by logic constrain the conceptual activity of indi-
viduals, Carnap is concerned primarily with the constitutive function of logical
norms vis-a`-vis rigorously defined systems of linguistic representation that codify
our scientific activity. As such, they do not straightforwardly apply to any old
episode of thinking. Consequently, the reach of logical norms—the individuals
29I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helping me clarify my thoughts on this matter.
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and activities that are constrained by these norms—appears to be rather more
limited on Carnap’s account than it is on Frege’s. For Frege, the normative force
of logic extends equally to ordinary thinking folk. Research scientists as much
as Joe Shmoe must acknowledge norms of logical cogency if they are to count as
thinking at all. (Although it matters a great deal more that we have a clear grasp
of logical propriety in scientific contexts.)
It is important, however, not to make too much of the question of the normative
reach of logic. Frege is no more concerned with the mental processes of individual
thinkers than Carnap. He, too, is primarily concerned with applying logic to
scientific discourse. It is simply an artifact of Frege’s ‘natural law’-conception of
the normativity of logic that the normative reach of logic extends to Joe Shmoe
and scientists alike. On Frege’s story, we said, any thinking being is bound by logic,
independently of whether he or she has endorsed any system of logic or even has
any explicit knowledge of logical principles at all. For the ‘legal positivist’ Carnap,
on the other hand, one is bound by logical laws only in virtue of having adopted
them (or, more precisely, the formal logico-linguistic framework that gives rise to
them). But clearly, ordinary thinkers have no truck with formal logical systems;
nor do they deliberately adopt them. Therein lies the reason why the question of
the normativity of logic only arises explicitly in the rarefied sphere of organized
scientific research for Carnap.
That being said, Carnap would presumably acknowledge that ordinary thinkers,
too, must operate on the basis of certain tacit logico-linguistic principles, even if
these principles have never been codified in any exact way. After all, linguistic
frameworks are merely formalized rational reconstructions of our ordinary infor-
mal logico-linguistic practices. So, even though formally articulated logical norms
are not constitutive for thinking tout court, presumably sensitivity to some kind
of tacitly acknowledged set of broadly logical norms is a necessary precondition
for the existence of any kind of system of linguistic representation whatsoever.
However, Carnap does not, to my knowledge, venture any more detailed claims
on the matter. In particular, he says little about the connection between thought
and talk. A possible explanation of this may be his repudiation of psychological
notions in the context of logic. True to his teacher, Carnap maintained that the
introduction of psychological notions of belief and inference is at best spurious, at
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worst, a source of psychologistic confusions. Nor would Carnap, a staunch nat-
uralist, have been tempted by Frege’s normativism about the mental phenomena
that make up thinking. Thinking, he claimed, ‘belongs to the subject matter of
[empirical] psychology but not to that of logic’ (Carnap 1962, p. 42).
It is not hard to see, though, why Carnap thought that science would stand to
gain much from the rigorous codification of its foundational principles in a formal
linguistic framework. The tacit principles regulating our informal practices are
not precise enough to determine well-defined shared standards of correctness. But
such shared standards are indispensable to serious scientific inquiry and hence to
scientific progress. And it is precisely the lack of such shared criteria that Carnap
takes to be responsible for the lack of progress in philosophical theorizing.30 Only
in the presence of such standards in the context of a sharply defined linguistic
framework is it possible even to formulate well-defined internal questions—i.e.
questions that we can hope to settle by means of the scientific principles and
modes of inference set out by the framework as well as, perhaps, through empirical
investigation.31
6 Conclusion
Let us summarize our comparison of Frege’s and Carnap’s versions of CT. We
began by noting that strict CT is incompatible with Carnap’s principle of toler-
ance. Instead we identified a relativized version of CT. There is not one logic but
a multiplicity of prima facie acceptable systems that are disjunctively constitu-
30See for instance (Carnap 1963, p. 45).
31Ricketts (1994, p. 182–183) takes a similar line:
Carnap also assigns to logic a fundamental regulative role in enquiry. We observed
that Carnap complains of ‘disputations in which opponents talk at cross purposes’
because there was no basis for ‘mutual understanding’, no common criterion for
deciding the controversy.’ Carnap believes that many such wrangles can be avoided,
if investigators formulate hypotheses in a syntactically described language. This
description fixes a consequence relation for the language; and only in the context
of such a relation can one statement be said to support, oppose, or be irrelevant
to another. A consequence relation is thus a basic and indispensable part of a
common criterion for adjudicating disputes: it grounds agreement on the relevance
of further statements to the hypothesis under consideration.
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tive: the very possibility of properly truth-evaluable claims presupposes that we
should fix on exactly one such system. Second, we found there to be a difference
pertaining this time to the norms’ targets—that which the norms are norms for:
whereas the target of Frege’s logical constitutive norms is thought, understood as
the conceptual activity of individuals, Carnap’s relativized constitutive norms set
the shared logico-linguistic standards of correctness that make productive scientific
theory possible in the first place.32
32Readers of Friedman (2001) may have recognized a resemblance between Carnap’s relativized
CT and Friedman’s notion of the ‘constitutive a priori’. Constitutive a priori principles have
the function of making the precise mathematical formulation and empirical appli-
cation of the theories [formulated on their basis] first possible (idem, p. 40)
and so represent the necessary presuppositions for a certain form of scientific inquiry. That
is, constitutive a priori principles play are, as it were, a generalization of synthetic a priori
knowledge, the target of Kant’s transcendental inquiry, which provides the conditions of the
possibility of empirical knowledge, e.g. Euclidian geometry and certain fundamental principles
of Newtonian mechanics. However, unlike Kant’s constitutive principles, which he took to be set
in stone, relativized a priori principles are not immune to revision. Advances in our scientific
theories may call for the adoption of novel linguistic frameworks encapsulating novel constitutive
principles. (See Friedman (2001) for further discussion and in particular for a defense against
Quinian attacks.) I take the notion of relativized CT to be compatible and indeed continuous
with Friedman’s constitutive a priori principles. What my account adds to Friedman’s is the
normative dimension. Furthermore, while Friedman considers constitutive principles—logical,
mathematical, physical—en bloc, my account isolates the constitutive role of logic.
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